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RACIAL PREJUDICE AND PUBLIC OPINION ON 
AMERICAN HEALTH CARE REFORM
Lawrence R. Belcher III
In September 2009, Jimmy Carter famously remarked to NBC’s Brian Williams, “I think an overwhelming portion of the intensely demonstrated animosity toward President Barack 
Obama is based on the fact that he is a black man.” !is comment 
came in the wake of several racially significant political events, nota-
bly Representative Joe Wilson’s (R-SC) outburst directed at Barack 
Obama (“You lie!”) during the President’s congressional address on 
the status of illegal immigrants, Dr. David McKalip’s widely circu-
lated “witch doctor” email, and the “9/12” protests in Washington. 
Carter reflected on the protests:
[Signs carried by protesters that say] “We should bury Obama 
with Kennedy” and “Obama is a Nazi” and Obama’s pictures 
with Hitler’s mustache on it—those kind of things are not just 
casual outcomes of a sincere debate over whether we should have 
a national program in health care or not. It’s deeper than that.1 
!ese protests gained notoriety after "Tea Party" demon-
strators carried out acts of physical abuse and shouted profani-
ties aimed at black politicians. On March 20, 2010, one protestor 
spat on Representative Emanuel Cleaver (D-MO), while another 
cried racial slurs at Representative John Lewis (D-GA). A third 
congressman, Representative James Clyburn (D-SC), remarked, “I 
heard people saying things that I have not heard since March 15, 
1960 when I was marching to try and get off the back of the bus.” 2
Media coverage of health care protests highlighted these in-
cidents of racism, and the idea quickly spread that opposition to 
Obama’s health care reform was associated with racial prejudice. 
!is sentiment was widespread enough to inspire a Rasmussen 
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poll asking respondents to rate whether “most opponents of Presi-
dent Obama’s health care plan are racist,” and even led to a popu-
lar YouTube video featuring anti-health-reform demonstrators 
indignantly arguing, “I guess I’m racist.” In the video,  filmmaker 
Ray Griggs argued that, “Americans have every right to speak out 
against the ruinous direction our nation is currently heading with-
out being labeled a racist.”3
Altogether, a defining characteristic of media coverage of 
health care reform is its focus on racial prejudice aimed at President 
Obama (and, to a lesser extent, other black leaders). As a result 
of this coverage, the Affordable Care Act became a symbolic issue 
for the President—a piece of legislation that seemed to encapsulate 
Obama’s political agenda. Given this, racialized opposition to the 
policy can be imagined mostly as an attempt to prevent Obama 
from achieving his campaign goals (Glenn Beck and Sarah Palin’s 
rally chant, “Take back our country,” comes to mind.)4  Marc Heth-
erington and Jonathan Weiler, who write a guest blog entry in the 
Washington Post, emphasize that Americans did not exhibit oppo-
sition to health care reform anywhere near this extent or intensity 
when President Clinton made a very similar proposal in the mid-
1990s.
But health care reform should theoretically be subject to a 
more generalized racial resentment as well—a possibility that has 
largely been ignored in media coverage of the plan (as well as the 
scholarship surrounding it). "e Affordable Care Act has the po-
tential to substantially benefit African-Americans, who are unin-
sured and suffer from chronic diseases at rates higher than those 
of whites. Most salient among the Act’s provisions are the expan-
sion of Medicaid coverage, elimination of the prescription coverage 
“loophole,” and government subsidies for low-income families to 
purchase private health insurance. More than half of the estimated 
fifty million Americans who will gain coverage as a result of the 
Affordable Care Act are racial minorities.5 "e recent health care 
reform initiatives are probably the most important legislation for 
the improvement of minorities’ life chances since the Voting Rights 
Act. And given the racially stained history of public opinion on so-
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cial welfare policies, we should be very interested to determine if 
attitudes on health care reform follow a similar pattern to opinion 
surrounding other "subtly" racial social issues like federal cash as-
sistance or food stamps.6 Representative Clyburn remarked after 
the racially charged Tea Party protest, “I think a lot of those people 
today demonstrate that this is not about health care . . . It is about 
trying to extend a basic fundamental right to people who are less 
powerful.”7 !e racial inequities that Representative Clyburn al-
ludes to are precisely why studying the Affordable Care Act as a ra-
cialized issue is so important. Racism on social policy does not ex-
ist in a vacuum. It affects, and is affected by, very real gaps in health 
conditions and access to health resources—many of which have 
life-threatening consequences. Discrepancies in health outcomes 
between whites and blacks are large; the overall life expectancy for 
blacks is 68.8 years, six years shorter than that of whites. Mortality 
rates for heart disease and cancer, the two leading causes of death in 
the United States, are significantly higher for blacks. !e propor-
tion of blacks who are uninsured is nearly twice that of whites.8 
!ese inequities are truly racial, as they persist net of economic sta-
tus and other demographic variables that are correlated with both 
race and limited access to health resources.9 “!e overall health of 
Black Americans is substantially less than that of white Americans 
. . . [and] their health mortalities and morbidities are also much 
greater due to continually increasing disparities in poverty, medical 
coverage, and access to care.”10 
!e whirlwind of attention surrounding the Affordable Care 
Act has formed a unique opportunity to study the relationship be-
tween race, social policy, and politics. Not only does this legislation 
promise to reduce dire discrepancies in health conditions between 
blacks and whites, it is also a landmark accomplishment of Ameri-
ca’s first black president. And while observational and experimental 
studies have already suggested that racial prejudice causes opposi-
tion to health care reform, we don’t know much about the specifics 
of this relationship (Knowles et al 2009; Hetherington and Weiler 
2009). In particular, there is a need to separate anti-Obama preju-
dice from a more generalized racial resentment regarding the per-
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ceived beneficiaries of health care reform. We should also prioritize 
learning more about the role of racial ideologies, since the expres-
sion of these ideologies can tell us a great deal about the social and 
psychological factors behind white reluctance to support the Af-
fordable Care Act.
EXISTING STUDIES ON RACE AND HEALTH CARE 
REFORM
!ere is a growing body of empirical evidence that Jimmy 
Carter’s hunch about racism and health care reform may be correct. 
Two important studies carried out in 2009 have demonstrated that 
implicit racial prejudice is a driving factor in opposition to health 
legislation. 
Marc Hetherington and Jonathan Weiler, social scientists at 
Vanderbilt University and the University of North Carolina, re-
spectively, collected survey data in 2009 indicating that racial re-
sentment and opposition to health care reform are “extraordinarily” 
strongly correlated. !ey found that individuals with above-av-
erage racial resentment were less than half as likely to favor gov-
ernment-run health care as individuals with below-average racial 
resentment.11 In a Washington Post column describing their initial 
results, the authors asserted that, “No such relationship between 
racial attitudes and opinions on health care existed in the mid-
1990s during the Clinton effort.”
!is is a tremendous finding in support of the general hy-
pothesis that racial prejudice plays a role in public opinion on the 
Affordable Care Act. But the article’s reliance on observational 
data has implications that limit the predictive power of its results. 
First, there is no way to definitively determine a causal process with 
observational data. It is entirely possible that some third factor, 
known or unknown, is causing both increased racial resentment 
and decreased support for health care reform. Geographical sur-
roundings, neighborhood context, political associations, and reli-
gious involvement come to mind.
Second, relying on explicit measures of racial attitudes, as 
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Hetherington and Weiler did, runs the risk of desirability bias: the 
result of respondents’ tendency to select answers that are seen as ac-
ceptable or desirable (even if these attitudes are not representative 
of their true beliefs). Measures of explicit racial prejudice, such as a 
racial resentment scale, are especially vulnerable to desirability bias. 
It may be difficult to make generalizable inferences about a popu-
lation from this data. My study attempts to remedy this problem, 
as well as the problem of causation, by turning to an experimental 
design. "e design of the present paper supplements these imper-
fect measures with an experimental treatment, emphasizing not the 
integrity of the survey items themselves but rather the changes ob-
served as a result of experimental manipulations.
Eric Knowles, Brian Lowery, and Rebecca Schaumberg con-
ducted the second important study in the organizational behavior 
lab at Stanford’s Graduate School of Business. Like Hetherington 
and Weiler, these authors examined the relationship between racial 
prejudice and opposition to health care reform, but they used an 
experiment rather than an analysis of observational data. Examin-
ing implicit prejudice while controlling for explicit prejudice, the 
authors found that, “[t]he association between implicit prejudice 
and opposition to health care reform replicated when the plan was 
attributed to Obama, but not to Bill Clinton—suggesting that in-
dividuals high in anti-black prejudice tended to oppose Obama at 
least in part because they dislike him as a black person.”12 "ey 
also found that implicit prejudice predicted “endorsement of spe-
cific concerns about the plan,” indicating that highly prejudiced in-
dividuals tended to hold concerns about health care reform (that 
it is a ‘dangerous step toward socialism’, etc.) at a higher rate than 
less-prejudiced individuals.13
But this study also leaves some important questions unan-
swered. First, assuming that “individuals high in anti-Black preju-
dice tended to oppose Obama at least in part because they dislike 
him as a Black person” may not be a fair conclusion. Attitudes about 
Clinton and Obama may be confounded with a whole host of polit-
ical differences, not to mention that Clinton has been absent from 
the average American’s political consciousness for almost a decade. 
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Americans may also form opinions about the presidents based on 
any number of personal characteristics completely independent of 
their race—even independent of their politics. My study attempts 
to remedy this problem by using narratives and imagery of a fic-
tional state with fictional politicians. !is way, attitudes about the 
political agents are unconfounded, and any differences I observe in 
the treatment groups can be attributed to the race of the politicians. 
(See section Methodology.)
Finally, neither study addresses the formation and makeup of 
the racial opinions at hand, nor how they relate to common ra-
cial ideologies employed by opponents of liberal social policies. We 
should learn as much as we can about the social and psychological 
precursors of this effect, so that we can better understand its practi-
cal implications.
THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO RACIAL ATTITUDES IN 
AMERICA
Scholars disagree on the initial causes of racial opposition 
to social policies. !ere are three main schools of thought, each 
emphasizing either psychological, political, or sociological founda-
tions. In their volume Racialized Politics (2000), David Sears, Jim 
Sidanius, and Lawrence Bobo14 outline three perspectives on ra-
cial opinion formation: new racism, principled conservatism, and 
group conflict theory. An adjacent body of literature is found in the 
study of colorblindness, which focuses on racial attitude expression 
rather than psychological formation of these attitudes. In addition, 
a multitude of research on local politics lays the framework for un-
derstanding whites’ attitudes toward black politicians. 
New Racism, Modern Racism, and Racial Resentment
!e first set of theories argues that while "Jim Crow" racism 
has largely faded into history, negative affect toward blacks and 
derogatory stereotypes remain powerful predictors of opinion on 
these policies. A “reservoir of racial antipathy decoupled from ra-
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cialist beliefs” lingers from earlier, more overt forms of racism and 
is responsible in large part for opposition to policies that benefit 
blacks.15
Much of the "new racism" is presumed to arise from percep-
tions among whites that blacks reject traditional American values, 
including a strong “work ethic, self-reliance, impulse control and 
obedience to authority.”16 It is also associated with a belief that 
since overt racism is no longer a dominant player in racial discourse, 
discrimination no longer threatens the life chances of blacks, and 
government intervention in racial affairs is unnecessary. 
New racism scholars point to evidence suggesting that racial 
resentment is the most powerful predictor of racial policy prefer-
ences, with political ideology holding less explanatory power.17 In 
this study, a post-treatment racial resentment scale indicates the 
presence of new racism. (See section Methodology.)
Principled Conservatism
A second set of theories emphasizes political considerations 
over racial ones in the formation of public opinion in social policy. 
Focusing on the observation that citizens can choose only among 
discrete political alternatives presented by the political infrastruc-
ture, principled conservatism theorists are reluctant to consider 
racism as a determinant of public opinion on racial policies.18 Paul 
Sniderman, a political scientist at Stanford, is the leading propo-
nent. He argues that the specific politics of each policy are more 
important to opinion formation than racial resentment or group 
conflict, pointing to evidence that opinion on racial policy is not de-
veloped consistently in different racial policies. Sniderman and his 
colleagues suggest that general political ideology and moral values 
should be the strongest predictors of opinion on racial and social 
policy.19 "e existence of political explanations for opposition to 
health care reform would be indicated in this study if I observe 
that racial attitudes are roughly equal across the treatment groups. 
In other words, we would have evidence for the Sniderman thesis 
if racial ideologies were expressed at a constant level, regardless of 
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racial framing.
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A third set of theories argues that social structure and group 
interests are the strongest predictors of opposition to black-bene-
fiting policies. !e central assumption is that citizens tend to iden-
tify with their own racial groups, and that “competing interests” of 
these groups generate “intergroup conflict.” In turn, groups that 
hold power develop ideologies to justify their status. Opposition 
to social policies by members of an in-group, then, comes from the 
incentive to protect group interests.20 
Donald Campbell promoted this school of thought and called 
it “realistic group conflict:”
From this perspective, whites’ political responses to racial issues 
should be driven by zero-sum competition with blacks for jobs, 
promotions, admission slots to colleges, government contracts, 
or other goods. !us, their opposition to racially ameliorative 
policies—and their antipathy toward the civil rights movement, 
its leaders, and even blacks themselves—can be explained by the 
threat blacks pose to whites’ privileges.21
Importantly, a number of studies have demonstrated that 
whites’ policy preferences are more closely related to group inter-
ests than individual self-interest.22 In other words, they challenge 
the idea that realistic group conflict is in fact “realistic.” For example, 
whites that do not have individual reasons to feel threatened by 
blacks (in terms of school busing, job placement, or college admis-
sions) are not much less opposed to “black-benefiting” policies than 
whites that do claim individual threat. Many scholars have inter-
preted this as evidence that races tend to form opinions with group 
interest at mind; they predict that whites will oppose racially liberal 
policies when they feel that their own group status is threatened.23 
In the present study, group conflict is indicated by a post-treatment 
measure of intergroup threat, which is included in the “Specific 
Concerns Scale” (see Results section).
One caveat: in understanding both racial resentment and 
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group conflict, it is important to keep in mind that health care re-
form is not an overtly racial policy. Unlike affirmative action, school 
busing, or equal housing legislation, for example, the imprint of race 
on opinion formation is subtler and perceived rather than openly 
discussed. With this said, we still have ample evidence that racial-
ized thought processes affect public opinion on subtly racial issues 
like welfare and food stamps.24  I argue that health care reform 
will be at least as vulnerable to racial influence as these policies, 
since the Affordable Care Act promises a profound improvement 
in health quality for a large population of underserved and under-
insured blacks, and since it has been widely understood as a signa-
ture project of the country’s first black president. 
Colorblind Ideology
If scholars disagree on the initial causes of racial opposition 
to social policies, they tend to agree on the types of ideologies that 
are employed by opponents to explain their policy preferences. 
While the previous section focused on racial attitude formation, 
this section addresses racial attitude expression. 
By far, the most commonly observed expressions can be at-
tributed to colorblindness—an ideology that asserts race should not 
be a consideration in drawing conclusions, forming judgments, or 
planning government policies. Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, a Duke soci-
ologist, authored a modern revision of colorblind racial theory, Rac-
ism without Racists. In this text, he attempts to explain the “strange 
enigma” of race: that virtually all whites claim to support equal ra-
cial opportunity, yet “blacks and most minorities are at the bottom 
of the well” with regard to life chances and conditions.25 Bonilla-
Silva argues:
Whites have developed powerful explanations—which have 
ultimately become justifications—for contemporary racial in-
equality that exculpate them from any responsibility for the sta-
tus of people of color. #ese explanations emanate from a new 
racial ideology that I call colorblind racism. #is ideology, which 
acquired cohesiveness and dominance in the late 1960s, explains 
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contemporary racial inequality as the outcome of nonracial dy-
namics.26
Bonilla-Silva outlines four frames that colorblind racism es-
tablishes in the consciousness of whites. !e two that are most 
important for this study are abstract liberalism and minimization 
of racism. Abstract liberalism involves reframing ideas typically as-
sociated with political and economic liberalism to account for racial 
issues. “By framing race-related issues in the language of liberalism, 
whites can appear ‘reasonable’ and even ‘moral’, while opposing al-
most all practical approaches to deal with de facto racial inequal-
ity.”27 Minimization of racism invokes arguments that racism has 
diminished with time and that discrimination is no longer a salient 
force.28 Leslie Carr, a sociologist at Old Dominion University and 
one of the first researchers to outline colorblind racism, notes that, 
“[t]he roots of color-blind ideology are found in the classic liberal 
doctrines of freedom—the freedom of the individual created by the 
free capitalist marketplace.”29 Proponents of colorblindness often 
assert that the Constitution is a color-blind document, and are op-
posed to government intervention in matters of racial opportunity, 
claiming that such intervention is “unconstitutional, immoral, and 
racist because the government is not [acting] color-blind.”30 Carr’s 
data suggests that about 77 percent of whites describe themselves 
as colorblind, while only 40 percent of blacks do.31
!e 2009 study by Eric Knowles and colleagues, which ex-
perimentally demonstrated that racial prejudice predicts opposi-
tion to contemporary health care reform, also makes the case that 
colorblindness is important to a complete understanding of public 
opinion formation:
!e present work is also consistent with social-psychological re-
search highlighting the manner in which individuals maintain a 
positive view of self even as their sociopolitical views are shaped 
by prejudice. Because most people wish to appear fair-minded—
both to others and to themselves—they often embrace more 
principled, “color blind” rationales for their race-based views . . . 
high-prejudice individuals in the present study expressed a num-
ber of race-neutral objections to Obama’s health care plan—in-
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cluding the notion that it represents a dangerous step toward 
socialism—that may function to obscure the racial dimension 
of their attitudes.32
A number of other studies in political psychology have ex-
plored the principles of colorblind racism. Sidanius, Pratto and 
Bobo (1996) note that, “Conservatives generally reject suggestions 
that their opposition to civil rights legislation is motivated by rac-
ism. Instead they maintain that this opposition is strictly driven by 
a principled consideration of fairness, equity, and the goal of estab-
lishing a truly color-blind society.”33 And David Sears, P.J. Henry, 
and Rick Kosterman (2000) outline the transition over the past 
several decades from classic prejudice and stereotyping to the “more 
politically important . . . intense white opposition to policies explic-
itly intended to increase racial equality, such as busing, affirmative 
action, and vigorously [sic] enforcement of fair employment and 
fair housing regulations.”34 
I believe that the expression of colorblind racial ideology is 
critical to learning more about the opinion formation of whites. 
As David Sears and his colleagues point out, these ideologies are 
incorporated into the three schools of thought outlined previously, 
and their relationship to public opinion is a point of contention 
that divides the arguments. For group conflict theorists, colorblind-
ness is an outcome and justification of racism. For political theo-
rists, colorblindness is a legitimate and static school of thought that 
causes opposition to racial policies on principled grounds. For new 
racism theorists, it exists as both an independent and dependent 
variable—both a justification employed by dissenters and a cause 
of some of the dissent itself:
In the hands of social structuralists, political ideology is to a 
significant degree a tool used by dominant groups to maintain their 
hegemony. In contrast, politically oriented theorists argue that it 
composes principles of self-governance reached through careful 
consideration and education and plays a central causal role in de-
termining attitudes toward racial policy. In the middle, perhaps, are 
new racism theorists, who see components of conservative ideol-
ogy as intertwined with racism, but with both making independent 
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contributions to racial policy preferences.35
In short, colorblindness is important to this study because it 
is the racial ideology most commonly associated with opposition 
to socially liberal policies. It also allows us to get a glimpse of some 
of the social and psychological precursors to policy preference by 
examining its expression across the four treatment groups. (For 
example, observing that colorblindness remains constant even as 
health care attitudes change has different implications than observ-
ing that colorblind attitudes are correlated with opposition to the 
new laws.)
White Response to Black Leadership
While the previous sections have outlined the prevailing 
schools of racial theory as they relate to policy opinion, an adjacent 
body of work addresses the attitudes of whites with regard to black 
political leaders. "is field offers limited background for the pres-
ent study, since scholarship on black leaders has until very recently 
excluded consideration of the presidency. Nevertheless, a wealth of 
research on racial politics at the local level may lay a framework by 
which we can understand whites’ opinions of black politicians in 
general.
In his landmark book Changing White Attitudes Toward Black 
Political Leadership, Zoltan Hajnal, a political scientist at the Uni-
versity of California, San Diego, categorizes existing scholarship 
into two camps: the prejudicial camp, which points to evidence 
that the racial attitudes of white Americans are so profoundly in-
grained that they cannot be modified by the prospect or reality of 
black politicians,36 and the white backlash camp, which argues that 
the political successes of blacks inspire whites to attempt to upend 
these achievements, given the incentive to maintain an advanta-
geous racial hierarchy37. 
On the other hand, Hajnal finds evidence that black office-
holding can actually improve race relations and whites’ opinions 
of blacks in general. He writes that many whites initially fear that 
black politicians will favor black interests over white interests, but 
62 &IPGLIV6EGMEP4VINYHMGIERH,IEPXL'EVI6IJSVQ
that once blacks are elected, “whites gain access to better informa-
tion about the policy preferences of black leaders and the effects 
of black leadership. "ey become able to judge black candidates 
on their records. And because the white community rarely suffers 
under black incumbents, these records are, in almost every case, 
better than white stereotypes and fears suggested they would be”38. 
Hajnal argues that while black representation in politics has been 
disappointing in its ability to improve racial equality and the gen-
eral welfare of black Americans, its “information effect” on whites’ 
racial attitudes has been significant.39
In Voting Hopes or Fears? White Voters, Black Candidates 
and Racial Politics in America, Keith Reeves, a political scientist at 
Swarthmore College, points out that by 1997 (the year of his book’s 
publication) only nine blacks in the history of the United States 
had been elected to represent mostly-white electoral districts in 
Congress.40 He argues that racial prejudice, racialized campaign 
coverage in the media, and the political exploitation of race in ap-
pealing to white fears have historically prevented black candidates 
from winning white votes.41 "is mobilization of fear is particu-
larly important; as a revealing example, Reeves highlights Jesse 
Jackson’s comments in 1983 upon the election of Harold Washing-
ton as Chicago’s first black mayor: “"ere was an unfounded fear 
[among white Chicagoans] . . . the idea that blacks once they take 
power will engage in retributive justice is just not so.”42
A unifying theme in the literature involves the phenomenon 
of white fear. Group conflict, information effects, white backlash, 
and colorblindness theorists all point to evidence that whites 
equate black officeholding with black policies, in turn benefiting 
black beneficiaries. Whites’ reluctance to elect blacks to office, then, 
can be understood as a mechanism of protecting an advantageous 
spot at the top of the racial ladder.  
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
"e goal of this paper is to shine empirical light on a phenom-
enon of great stakes but little scholarly attention. Popular media 
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outlets have speculated on the role of racism in Americans’ reac-
tions to the Affordable Care Act since the plan was first proposed 
in 2009.43 But to date, only one published study and one paper in 
progress have examined the topic, and as outlined in the Existing 
Studies section, neither of these approaches can account for the pos-
sibility that health care reform is a racially significant policy outside 
of its endorsement by President Obama.44
Given this background, the principal goal is to confirm previ-
ous studies’ findings that racial prejudice has an effect on health 
care reform attitudes—this time in a politically isolated setting 
without confounding allusions to Presidents Obama or Clinton. 
Second, this study aims to separate racial prejudice at the politician 
level (analogous to anti-Obama prejudice) from resentment re-
garding the race of perceived beneficiaries. "ird, it aims to test the 
hypothesis that colorblind racial attitudes and racial resentment 
are affected by the race of the stakeholders in proposed health care 
plans. Finally, it aims to learn as much as possible about the practi-
cal implications of this effect.
METHODOLOGY
I use a survey-embedded experiment to assess how racial 
prejudice may affect policy opinion, colorblind racism, racial re-
sentment, and attitudes about President Obama among a repre-
sentative sample of voting-age Americans. Specifically, the experi-
ment is designed to measure how these indicators vary depending 
on the race of the stakeholders in a proposal for health care reform. 
By “stakeholders,” I mean the politician proposing the plan and the 
beneficiaries (or patients) expected to benefit from it.
Respondents are randomly assigned to one of four treatment 
groups, each of which includes an identical narrative of a proposed 
health care reform plan in Maryland, but different images of the 
politician who endorses the plan and of the beneficiaries affected 
by it. Images of the politicians are portrait-style, with the two men 
dressed in navy business suits and in office settings. "ey both ap-
pear to be between forty and fifty years of age. Patients are photo-
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graphed in similar clinical settings, surrounded by medical equip-
ment, and each treatment group shows one adult patient as well as 
one child. 
!e narrative describes expanding coverage very similar to 
the Affordable Care Act: expanding Medicaid services to all citi-
zens under age sixty-five, subsidizing private insurance plans for 
families with income below $70,000, and increasing funding for 
free clinics and community health centers. Funding for the plan is 
attributed to raising income taxes for the highest-earning 2 percent 
of Maryland residents, taxing residents who purchase high-end 
“Cadillac” insurance plans, and taxing insurers and pharmaceutical 
companies. 
!e treatment narratives include brief summaries of pro and 
con arguments for the proposal. “Supporters of the plan argue that 
this expanded coverage is necessary to provide basic health benefits 
to individuals and families who do not have them,” and, “Oppo-
nents of the plan argue that the state cannot handle the expense of 
the program, that it penalizes wealthy taxpayers, or that people in 
medically underserved areas should take the initiative to find care 
on their own.” In each treatment, the plan is attributed to a gu-
bernatorial candidate with a race-neutral name, “Dominic Evans,” 
whose portrait (an image of either a black politician or a white poli-
tician) is displayed prominently. !e script used in the four treat-
ment groups is reproduced in the Appendix. 
!is structure follows a 2x2 (Governor x Patient) factorial 
design, with the goal of separating anti-black animus surrounding 
politicians (i.e. “Dominic Evans” or President Obama) from anti-
black animus surrounding the perceived beneficiaries of expand-
ing health coverage. !is design also has the benefit of minimizing 
demand effects, as the policymakers and beneficiaries differ only 
by their race. Since the narratives are identical in each group, the 
political platforms attributed to both iterations of Dominic Evans 
are identical, as are the benefits granted to both sets of patients.
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Dependent Variable Measurement
Post-treatment, subjects were asked to provide their overall 
assessment of the plan, from 0 (“strongly oppose”) to 10 (“strongly 
support”). !e mean response is 6.64 (sd=2.65). 
!e survey also asked subjects to respond to a bank of “spe-
cific concern” statements taken from media reports of opposition to 
health care reform. !ey are:
?? “!is plan is too expensive, especially right now. Governor 
Evans should be focusing on other things.”
?? “!is plan makes me feel like I’m losing control of a sys-
tem that already works.” (!is is an indicator of intergroup 
threat. See section !eoretical Approaches to Racial Attitudes 
in America.)
?? “What would you say is the likelihood that this plan would 
result in health rationing, where not everyone gets all the care 
they need?”
?? “What would you say is the likelihood that this plan would 
result in benefits going to people who don’t deserve them?”
?? “What would you say is the likelihood that this plan would 
result in a government takeover of the health care industry?”
!ese concerns were compiled into an additive index (Cron-
bach’s alpha  = 0.70).
Next, respondents completed a modified Colorblind Racial 
Attitudes Scale, or CoBRAS.45 !is scale measures attitudes 
that could be classified as “colorblind racism.” To reduce attrition 
due to the survey’s length, the original twenty-item CoBRAS was 
trimmed to twelve items. !e questions that remained were cho-
sen by the factor analysis included in Neville’s original paper: the 
four highest-scoring factors within each of three dimensions (Ra-
cial Privilege, Institutional Discrimination, and Blatant Racial Is-
sues) were retained. Cronbach’s alpha for this modified scale was 
0.82, only slightly reduced from .86 in Neville’s initial validation. 
Some questions were reverse coded in my analysis so that a higher 
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value consistently indicated “more colorblind.” Respondents then 
completed the six-item Racial Resentment Scale.46 !is was also 
compiled into an additive index (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.84). Some 
questions were reverse coded so that a higher value consistently in-
dicated higher levels of racial resentment.
Finally, respondents were asked to give their overall assess-
ment of President Obama, and to compare the Maryland proposal 
with their overall sentiments toward Obama’s national health care 
reform plan.
Sample
!e survey was offered to a socioeconomically, ideologically, 
and racially diverse panel managed by the Chicago Research Lab 
at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. Subjects 
needed only to live in the United States and be eighteen years of 
age or older to meet the inclusion criteria. In the online portal used 
by survey respondents, the study was entitled, “Win $75! Political 
Opinion Survey.” Respondents were not directly compensated, but 
were given the chance to enter a drawing for a seventy-five dollar 
prize. Data were collected for two weeks.
One hundred sixty-five respondents completed the survey, 
ninety-six of which (or 58 percent) were white. Because this study 
focuses on the attitudes of voting-age white Americans, only these 
ninety-six respondents were included in the final analysis. !e at-
titudes of members of other races, particularly African-Americans, 
are theoretically relevant to this topic, but the sample of blacks and 
other minorities was not large enough to draw generalizable con-
clusions. 
Among the eligible whites, between 85.4 percent and 92.7 
percent were included in the analysis, depending on the outcome 
variable. !e remainder were excluded because they omitted re-
sponses for variables of interest. Participants who omitted these 
responses do not appear to be demographically different from par-
ticipants who answered them; in other words, they are not consis-
tently poorer, less educated, or ideologically different from respon-
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dents who completed the survey (analysis not shown here).
!is study unintentionally oversamples for young adults, po-
litical independents, women, and people who are well-educated, 
non-religious, uninsured, and who live in urban areas. !ese biases 
require attention, but they do not impede the ability to draw gener-
alizable conclusions. As I will discuss in the following sections, this 
paper’s experimental design, aided by covariates, is a robust method 
of controlling for the demographics and ideological predispositions 
that play into public opinion formation.
Analysis Methods
Differences in dependent variables between treatment groups 
are analyzed using ordinary least squares regression. Regression 
models are designed to make inferences from a 2x2 factorial de-
sign, where the effects of being exposed to the black or white gover-
nor, and being exposed to the black or white patients, are evaluated 
separately. (!e interactive effect of being exposed to the governor 
and patients of the same race is also tested.) Two dummy variables 
(coded 0 for white governor or white patients, and 1 for black gov-
ernor or black patients) are constructed from the four treatment 
groups, and correspond to the two exposures of interest. 
Regression equations presented in the Results section follow 
a general equation:
Y = ȕxgovernor + ȕxpatients + ȕxiÂÂÂȕxn + ο
where ȕgovernor is the effect of  exposure to the black gov-
ernor (1=black, 0=white), ȕxpatients is exposure to the black pa-
tients, ȕxi ··· ȕxn are the effects of  covariates, and ο is the error 
term.
For simpler interpretation, I also provide first differences cal-
culated by King et al’s Clarify package for Stata.47 !is gives the 
predicted difference in scale units when an experimental treatment 
is changed (for example, the predicted difference in an average re-
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spondent’s policy assessment if the race of the politician were to 
change from white to black).
Covariates
Strictly speaking, randomization by itself is the best way to 
eliminate the influence of confounding variables. !at is, by vir-
tue of randomly assigning subjects to treatment groups, we are also 
randomly assigning the myriad covariates—both known and un-
known—that have a confounding influence on the dependent vari-
ables. Since the confounds are randomly (and equally) distributed 
in a sufficiently large sample, we can be reasonably confident that 
any observed differences can be attributed to our treatments and 
not to confounds. 
But there are a few compelling reasons why covariates can 
aid in the analysis of randomized data. For example, covariates 
can increase the predictive power of models; they ensure that con-
founding variables were in fact randomly distributed among the 
treatment groups, and they can help identify nonrandom attrition, 
providing a statistical control where this problem exists.48 Where a 
sample is not ideally representative of the population being studied 
(as is the case in this paper), covariates enable statistical control 
or stratified analyses for demographics that are disproportionately 
represented.
However, for the purposes of this study, covariates are most 
important because they provide information about interactions 
between pre-treatment conditions (for example, political ideology 
or income) and the treatments themselves. !e Results section dis-
cusses this in greater detail.
In all, six covariates are taken into consideration in my analy-
sis. Four of these are indicators of ideological predisposition: sex, 
educational attainment, household income, and political party 
identification. !e final two are indicators of self-interest in a 
health care policy: insurance status and self-rated health.
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In the context of existing studies on the relationship between 
health care reform and racial prejudice (particularly Knowles, 
Lowery, and Schaumberg 2009), the methods I employ have two 
unique advantages.
First, this paper treats health care reform as a social issue sub-
ject to two potentially distinct manifestations of racial prejudice: 
anti-black attitudes stemming from the design and endorsement by 
President Obama and anti-black attitudes related to the perceived 
race of beneficiaries of the plan. !is approach takes into account 
the work of Knowles, Lowery, and Schaumberg in addressing the 
role of politician race in predicting whites’ public opinion. But it 
also takes into account work similar to Nicholas Winter, Donald 
Kinder, Lynn Sanders, and Martin Gilens insofar as it considers 
the possibility that health care reform is manifested as a racial issue 
in the minds of Americans, much like other social policies (espe-
cially those that fall under the category of welfare programs).
Second, this paper eliminates the political and personal con-
founds that arise from studying Bill Clinton and Barack Obama 
directly. Knowles, Lowery, and Schaumberg compare policy opin-
ions after randomly assigning subjects to read an “Obama frame” 
or a “Clinton frame.” !is paper instead compares reactions to two 
politicians whose only difference is their race. Since these policy-
makers are fictional, any confounding political attitudes (like those 
that affect Presidents Obama and Clinton) do not influence the 
results in this study.
RESULTS
!e following analysis is organized by dependent variable.
Overall Policy Opinion
Respondents were asked to rate their overall opinion of the 
proposed policy on a 0-10 scale, where “10” is most supportive. !is 
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variable was regressed on the experimental treatments and covari-
ates to measure the effect of racial exposures on respondents’ over-
all policy opinion. Results are presented in Table 1.
We see that exposure to the black governor predicts a mod-
erate49 (coefficient=-1.47) and significant (p<0.05) decrease in 
policy opinion. #ere is no significant effect found for exposure to 
black patients. Main effects and interactions were tested, and no 
significant interaction effect was found for exposure to the black 
governor and black patients together (not shown here). #ese re-
sults indicate that we can expect white respondents, on the aggre-
gate, to be less supportive of a health care reform plan when the 
policymaker is black. #ere is no evidence that whites’ opinions on 
the plan are affected by the race of presented beneficiaries. #ese 
effects are preserved when covariates are included in the model.
#e estimated first difference for governor race is -1.47 
points on a 0-10 point scale (95 percent confidence interval: [-0.19, 
-2.74]). #is means that if we change the race of the policymaker 
from white to black, the expected decrease in support from a typi-
cal white respondent would be 1.47 points. #is is the equivalent 
of moving from a score of 5 (perfectly ambivalent) to 3.53 (leaning 
to unsupportive), displayed in Figure 1. #e expected difference 
upon manipulation of patient race was included for comparison, 
although this effect is not statistically significant.
7TIGM½G'SRGIVRW7GEPI
Respondents were asked several questions designed to mea-
sure their attitudes on specific criticisms of the policy. #ese criti-
cisms were inspired by common concerns highlighted in media 
coverage of federal health care reform. (See previous section for de-
tails.) Five of these items were scaled into an additive index (Cron-
bach’s alpha = 0.70). #is scale was regressed on the experimental 
treatments and covariates to measure the effect of racial exposures 
on respondents’ specific concerns regarding the proposed health 
care plan. Results are displayed in Table 2, available in the online 
supplement.
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We see that exposure to the black governor predicts a small 
(coefficient=-1.55) and significant (p<0.05) decrease in the Spe-
cific Concerns Scale. A lower score on this scale indicates that re-
spondents agree with criticisms of the law; in other words, a lower 
score indicates greater concern. "erefore, our results indicate that 
we would expect whites to express higher levels of specific concern 
regarding a health care plan when the policymaker is black. "is 
increase applies to concerns such as undeserving beneficiaries, gov-
ernment takeover of the health care system, and health rationing. 
"ere is no evidence that the race of the beneficiaries has an effect 
on whites’ concerns about the law.  "ese effects are preserved when 
covariates are included in the model.
"e estimated first difference for governor race is -1.54 
points on a 5-19 point scale (95 percent confidence interval: [-.165, 
-2.97]). "is means that if the race of the politician were to change 
from white to black, the resultant decrease in specific concerns 
score is expected to be 1.54 points.
INTERACTIONS WITH COVARIATES: PARTY 
IDENTIFICATION AND INCOME
In predicting policy opinion scores, significant interactive ef-
fects were found between exposure to the black governor and two 
covariates: party identification and household income. A third co-
variate, insurance status, is also examined.
4EVX]-HIRXM½GEXMSR
Results presented in Table 3 (online) show a large (coeffi-
cient=-2.04) and significant (p<0.05) interaction between party 
identification and exposure to the black governor.
Since the party identification variable is coded [1=Democrat, 
2=independent, 3=Republican], this model suggests that either an 
Independent or a Republican identification (or both) modifies the 
effect of exposure to the black governor on policy opinion. For a 
more precise view, Table 4 (online) shows the regression model 
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stratified by party identification.
Results in Table 4 show a large (coefficient=-2.97) and sig-
nificant (p<0.01) effect for exposure to the black governor among 
Independents. #is exposure has no significant effect among Dem-
ocrats or Republicans when these groups are examined in isola-
tion. While the Republican group appears to have an effect size 
comparable to that of independents, this effect is not significant, 
probably because my sample of Republicans is too small to make 
a confident inference. #ere is no significant effect for exposure to 
black patients in any of the stratified groups. 
#ese results suggest that exposure to the black policymaker 
predicts a large decrease in policy opinion among independent (un-
affiliated) whites. #is might be interpreted as evidence that in-
dependent whites approach political issues like health care reform 
without strong or inflexible opinions, many of which are associated 
with partisanship. In the absence of this policy “cueing” from a po-
litical party, independents might be more sensitive to racial prim-
ing. Effectively, partisan tendencies may serve to buffer the racial ef-
fect, and the people with the least powerful buffers (independents) 
experience the racial effect at a greater magnitude.
To clarify the ideological makeup of the independents group, 
an identical regression was executed (not shown here), replacing 
Party Identification with Political Ideology [1=Liberal, 2=Moder-
ate, 3=Conservative]. #e results from Table 4 were replicated: we 
see a large and significant decrease in opinion with exposure to the 
black governor among ideological moderates. #ere is no signifi-
cant effect found among conservatives or liberals, initially suggest-
ing that most of the independents in the Table 4 models are likely 
“unaffiliated” moderates, and not members of an independent party 
(with the major caveat that the sample sizes are unequal, making 
generalizable inference difficult).
#e estimated first difference for exposure to the black gov-
ernor among independent whites is -2.97 points (95 percent con-
fidence interval: [-0.91, -5.11]) on a 0-10 scale. #is means that 
if we change the race of the policymaker from white to black, the 
expected decrease in opinion among white independents is 2.97 
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points, or the equivalent of moving from a score of 5 (perfectly am-
bivalent) to 2.03 (unsupportive).
Income
A second interactive effect is found between household in-
come and exposure to the black governor. Table 5 (online) presents 
these findings.
We see a tremendous (coefficient=-4.25) and significant 
(p<0.01) negative effect for the interaction between high income 
and exposure to the black governor. High income is coded as 
$60,000 or greater, which constitutes roughly the top half of the 
income distribution in the sample. Table 6 (online) presents results 
stratified by income for a closer look.
We see a very large (coefficient=-3.23) and significant 
(p<0.01) decrease in policy opinion with exposure to the black 
governor among higher-income whites. #is effect is not replicated 
for lower-income whites. Exposure to the black patients does not 
appear to have a significant effect in either stratum. 
#is suggests that we should expect politician race to have a 
significant sway on the policy assessments of higher-income whites. 
#e first difference for exposure to the black governor among whites 
with income of $60,000 or greater is -3.21 points on a 0-10 scale 
(95 percent confidence interval: [-1.05, -5.33]). #is means that we 
would expect opinion among this group to decrease by 3.21 points 
when the governor changes from white to black—the equivalent 
of moving from a score of 5 (perfectly ambivalent) to 1.79 (very 
unsupportive), shown in Figure 2.
Insurance Status
No statistically significant interactive effect was found for in-
surance status, but this variable should be of special interest. Do 
whites that stand to gain a material benefit from health care reform 
(i.e. insurance coverage) react differently to racial priming than 
whites who are already insured?
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!e results reported in Table 7 indicate that uninsured 
whites are almost completely insensitive to racial priming. !ere is 
no significant (or substantial) effect found for either politician race 
or patient race. Fully-insured whites, on the other hand, see a mod-
erate decrease in support for the health plan when a black politician 
designs it (coefficient=-2.28, p<.01). !is suggests that we should 
expect uninsured whites to pay little attention to the racial stakes of 
a health care plan, while insured whites who do not expect a mate-
rial gain are heavily swayed by the race of the politician in charge. 
!e estimated first difference of this effect is -2.27 points on a scale 
from 0 to 10 points (95 percent confidence interval: [-0.61, -4.00]). 
!is is the equivalent of moving from a score of 5 (perfectly am-
bivalent) to 2.73 (unsupportive).
CORRELATED IDEOLOGIES: COLORBLINDNESS, RACIAL 
RESENTMENT AND SUPPORT FOR BARACK OBAMA
After evaluating the proposed health care plan, respondents 
were asked to complete a twelve-item modified Colorblind Racial 
Attitudes Scale (CoBRAS) and the six-item Kinder and Sanders 
Racial Resentment Scale. !ey were also asked to provide an over-
all assessment of their feelings toward President Obama.
Colorblindness
A regression analysis for CoBRAS scores and experimental 
treatments is presented in Table 8 (available online). We see a mod-
est (coefficient=5.84) and significant (p<.01) increase in expressed 
colorblindness among white subjects when exposed to the black 
governor. Exposure to the black patients does not appear to have 
a significant effect. 
!ese results indicate that we expect whites to express mod-
estly higher levels of colorblind racial attitudes when exposed to a 
health care plan endorsed by a black politician as compared to an 
identical plan put forth by a white politician. !e first difference for 
this effect is 5.82 points on a scale from 12 to 64 points (95 percent 
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confidence interval: [1.42, 10.14]). 
Racial Resentment
Regression analysis for racial resentment scores and experi-
mental treatments is presented in Table 9 (available online). We 
see a modest (coefficient=3.41) and significant (p<.01) increase 
in racial resentment among whites exposed to the black governor. 
"ere does not appear to be a significant effect for exposure to the 
black patients. 
"ese findings indicate that we should expect whites to ex-
press modestly higher levels of racial resentment when exposed to 
a health care plan attributed to a black politician as compared to an 
identical plan put forth by a white politician. "e first difference for 
this effect is 3.52 points on a scale from 6 to 36 points (95 percent 
confidence interval: [0.89, 6.37]).
Support for Barack Obama
Respondents were asked to rate their overall feelings toward 
President Obama on a 0 to 10 scale, where 10 indicates that a re-
spondent feels “very positively.” Regression analysis for Obama 
support and the experimental treatments is presented in Table 10. 
We observe a moderate (coefficient=-1.79) and significant (p<.01) 
decrease in support among whites exposed to the black patients. 
Notably, Obama support is the only dependent variable that is sig-
nificantly affected by exposure to black beneficiaries (and the only 
variable not affected by exposure to the black policymaker).
"ese results indicate that we should expect whites to express 
moderately lower levels of support for President Obama when con-
sidering a health care plan whose perceived beneficiaries are black, 
as compared to a plan whose perceived beneficiaries are white.
"e first difference for exposure to black patients is -1.81 
points on a scale from 0 to 10 points (95 percent confidence inter-
val: [-0.57, -3.05]). "is means we would expect the average white 
respondent’s support for Barack Obama to decrease by 1.81 points 
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when considering a health care plan whose beneficiaries are pre-
sented as black as compared to an identical plan whose perceived 
beneficiaries are white. !is is the equivalent of moving from a 
score of 5 (perfectly ambivalent) to 3.19 (somewhat negative), dis-
played in Figure 3.
!is is a fascinating finding. It demonstrates that whites are 
less satisfied with Obama when health care benefits blacks, yet 
from findings in previous sections we know that black beneficiaries 
do not inspire whites to dislike the plan itself. !is offers compel-
ling evidence in favor of Hajnal’s “information effect,” as I will dis-
cuss in the next section.
DISCUSSION
!is experiment provides strong evidence that race plays a 
substantial role in public opinion formation on health care reform. 
!e race of the politician and beneficiaries at stake in a health care 
plan accounts for about 7 percent of the total variance in policy opin-
ion among whites—more than the effects of four covariates (sex, 
education, self-rated health, and insurance status) combined. !is 
proportion is higher in certain populations.50 Among whites with 
a household income above $60 thousand, the race of the politician 
and beneficiaries explains about 20 percent of the variance in policy 
opinion. Among independent voters, the proportion is 23 percent. 
Among whites who are both independent voters and wealthy, race 
can predict about 32 percent of the variance in opinion. All of these 
are tremendous figures, even the aggregate 7 percent, considering 
the incredible plethora of influences on policy opinion. In light of 
all the factors that play into an individual’s assessment of a political 
proposal—personal predispositions, partisan alignments, material 
self-interest, ethical instincts, details of the plan, and others—the 
race of the stakeholders in a health care plan has a powerful sway 
on public opinion.
In the context of other studies, the contribution of this pa-
per is the discovery that different stakeholders do not affect pub-
lic opinion equally. !e race of the politician promoting a health 
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reform plan has a much larger impact on opinion than the race 
of the plan’s beneficiaries. !is may help understand some of the 
intensely-demonstrated (and well-publicized) opposition to Presi-
dent Obama’s health care plans.51 It is also consistent with Marc 
Hetherington and Jonathan Weiler’s conclusion that the relation-
ship between racial resentment and health care attitudes observed 
in 2009 did not exist in the 1990s with Bill Clinton’s similar pro-
posal, even though both plans disproportionately benefit African 
Americans. In a vacuum, whites demonstrate opposition to health 
care reform under a black politician when their attitudes are neutral 
under a white politician. !is supports the assertion that President 
Obama’s race can help explain why Americans exhibited a much 
stronger resistance to health care reform in 2009 than they did in 
the 1990s, supporting Hetherington and Weiler’s (as well as Jimmy 
Carter’s) hunch. 
Is Health Care Reform a Type of Welfare?
On the other hand, how might we interpret the finding that 
the race of a plan’s beneficiaries has little effect on whites’ public 
opinion formation? !is runs contrary to my initial assertion, as 
well as a wealth of scholarship that suggests that this relationship 
might exist. Part of the theoretical justification for this paper rests 
on the possibility that health care reform, legislation that tremen-
dously benefits blacks and other minorities, could be affected by 
both anti-Obama prejudice and a more generalized racial resent-
ment. !at does not appear to be the case. 
!is finding is slightly out of tune with most social policy 
research. !ere is ample evidence that “the American public thinks 
that most people who receive welfare are black,” and that “whites’ 
attitudes toward poverty and welfare are dominated by their beliefs 
about blacks.”52 If this were the case with health care reform, we 
would expect to see changes in both policy opinion and specific 
concerns when comparing reactions to two plans that are presented 
to benefit different races. No such relationship is observed in this 
study.
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Do whites conceptualize the expanding coverage provided by 
the Affordable Care Act the same way they conceptualize other so-
cial welfare programs? "is study is not equipped to provide a de-
finitive answer, but the initial evidence seems to suggest that white 
Americans view health care reform no differently than other forms 
of social policy. Forty-eight percent of whites in the sample agreed 
or strongly agreed that the proposal they viewed constitutes “a form 
of welfare,” compared to half as many (24 percent) that disagreed 
or strongly disagreed. "e rest were unsure. "is variable by itself 
was not significantly affected by the exposure to the experimental 
treatments. But not coincidentally, whites who characterize health 
care reform as a welfare program are significantly less likely to sup-
port the plan. "e mean policy opinion score for the ‘welfare’ group 
was 5.07; it was 7.89 for the ‘not welfare’ group.
It is possible, though not demonstrable under this research 
design, that whites imagine the beneficiaries of social redistribu-
tion policies like health care reform to be black regardless of the 
racial priming provided in an experimental setting. Alternatively, it 
is also possible that whites are sincerely ambivalent about the race 
of a health plan’s beneficiaries, although this seems unlikely given 
their sensitivity to the race of the politician and existing evidence 
that shows a strong connection between whites’ unflattering char-
acterizations of blacks and their public opinion on social policies.53 
A third possibility is that whites imagine the beneficiaries of health 
care reform to be mostly black, but that the redistribution of ‘ben-
efits’ (e.g. health insurance) resulting from the Affordable Care Act 
is more palatable than what is found in other government welfare 
programs (such as cash payouts or food stamps).
Self-Interest and Rational Choice
"e role of self-interest in racial prejudice is a second area 
of scholarly debate that this paper has examined. Researchers dis-
agree on the way that self-interest is incorporated into racialized 
thinking on social policy, with ‘realistic’ or ‘zero-sum competition’ 
theorists in one camp, and ‘group conflict’ theorists in the other. 
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!is paper gives mixed evidence with regard to self-interest. First, 
the data indicate that fully insured respondents are much more 
receptive to racial priming than uninsured respondents. Insured 
whites were significantly (and substantially) less supportive of the 
health care plan designed by the black politician. !is effect was 
not observed among uninsured whites, indicating that self-interest 
buffers racialized thinking. In other words, whites with something 
to gain from health care reform (e.g., insurance coverage) do not 
care, on the aggregate, about the race of the politician behind the 
plan. !us, it appears that self-interest matters.
But if insured whites cannot expect to gain from the policy 
no matter who endorses it, why should they care about the race of 
the politician any more than uninsured whites do? In the frame-
work of colorblindness, to which the majority of whites ascribe, 
rational actors should not care whether whites or blacks endorse 
their legislation. !ey may support a plan more or less depending 
on their own self-interest, but within strata of material interest, ra-
tional whites should support the black-endorsed plan as much as 
the white-endorsed plan. From the data presented here, this is not 
the case. Absent the promise of a direct material gain, whites react 
negatively to health care legislation put forth by a black politician. 
Why is this?
In his book, Voting Hopes or Fears? White Voters, Black Candi-
dates & Racial Politics in America, Keith Reeves argues that, “racial 
discrimination by whites . . . still remains a prodigious barrier for 
black candidates competing in majority-white electoral settings.”54 
Of course, black candidates do not completely lack political success 
in majority-white settings (including in statewide campaigns and, 
as of 2008, the presidency). But Reeves cautions that “the success of 
some black office-seekers in getting sufficient numbers of whites to 
vote for them” does not nullify the continuing influence of racism. 
He points to research conducted by Richard Pildes in 1995, who 
argues that, “the increase in black officeholding is not the result of 
changing attitudes or voluntary reforms.”55
Public opinion on social policy and voting patterns for black 
candidates are not exactly the same, but the overarching message 
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from the present study (as well as existing research) is that whites 
are reluctant to support the political efforts of black politicians. In 
this experiment, exposure to the black politician triggered increased 
racial resentment among whites, indicating that implicit prejudice 
(akin to the “New Racism” theories explained in the !eoretical Ap-
proaches section) may hold a powerful influence on public opinion 
formation.
"is study also finds that exposure to the black politician 
leads to higher levels of colorblind racial attitudes, consistent with 
Eduardo Bonilla-Silva’s theory that these “principles” are used to 
"explain away" racial resentment. "e results are inconsistent, how-
ever, with Paul Sniderman’s assertion that "principled conserva-
tism" is at the root of white reluctance to black-benefiting policies. 
"is is not to say that one theory is more accurate than the other, 
but Bonilla-Silva’s framework is more capable of explaining the re-
sults observed in this study.
I am unable to find evidence for the existence of “realis-
tic group conflict” in the context of health care reform, since this 
would be indicated by an increase in specific concerns and decrease 
in overall opinion when whites are prompted to believe the pri-
mary beneficiaries of the law are black. In other words, realistic 
group conflict theory operates on the assumption that health care 
is a limited resource, and whites would aim to prevent blacks from 
benefiting. In the context of the Affordable Care Act, a more likely 
possibility is that whites interpret their group status to be threat-
ened when a black politician is at the helm.
Indeed, one of the most fascinating discoveries in this study 
centers on the last variable discussed in the Results section: support 
for President Obama. "e data indicate that support for Obama 
decreases when whites are exposed to imagery of black beneficiaries, 
but not images of black politicians. Support for Obama is the only 
dependent variable that was triggered by beneficiary race. "is is 
extremely compelling evidence for Zoltan Hajnal’s “information ef-
fect,” a theoretical framework based on the observation that whites 
fear having blacks in office because they believe black politicians 
will meet the policy needs of black constituents, ostensibly at the 
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expense of whites. 
In the case of health care reform, we observe that support for 
a black politician (President Obama) decreases when whites are 
primed to believe that the beneficiaries of a health care plan are 
also black. !is is concrete evidence for Hajnal’s basic assumption. 
What’s more, Barack Obama, as the first black president, plays a 
special role in information effects theory. Hajnal remarks:
Prior to the election of a black candidate, most white voters 
have little or no experience with black leadership. For this rea-
son, many rely on racial stereotypes and past patterns in race 
relations to assess the likely consequences of a black candidate’s 
victory. !e result is that many whites fear that a black leader 
will . . . redistribute income, encourage integration and gener-
ally channel resources toward the black community . . .  Once a 
black candidate is elected, however, whites gain access to better 
information about the policy preferences of black leaders and 
the effects of black leadership . . .  When blacks have the power 
(or are perceived as having the power) to inflict harm on the 
white community and they choose not to do so, many whites are 
forced to reevaluate their assumptions.56
Voters’ reactions to President Obama in this study are con-
sistent with the information effects framework, offering evidence 
that the racialized enigma surrounding Obama’s health care plan 
can be traced to the political psychology surrounding new black 
leadership. Absent a history of black officeholding in the Oval Of-
fice, whites speculate that the beneficiaries of the president’s agenda 
will be black—and when images of black patients in the treatment 
groups confirm this suspicion, their support for the black president 
decreases. 
Unanswered Questions
!is study has partially elucidated the relationship between 
racial prejudice and public opinion on American health care re-
form. However, several important questions remain unanswered 
and will require further research. 
First, since this study focuses exclusively on white attitudes, 
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a full inference of American public opinion is not possible. More 
research is required to examine the racial attitudes of blacks and 
other minorities, as their reactions to health care reform are likely 
different from those of whites. We should be especially interested 
to see how the race of stakeholders (politicians and patients) in 
proposed health care plans affects public opinion among minori-
ties.
Second, we do not know the exact consequences of using a 
slightly biased sample, which overrepresented students, women, 
political independents, and people in urban settings. It is especially 
prudent to note that the majority of the sample lived in or near 
Chicago, which may mean that the results are most generalizable 
for populations in racially diverse metropolitan areas. "ey may be 
less useful for predicting racial attitudes in less populated or more 
homogenous regions. 
"is being said, I do not feel that this sample biased the re-
sults in any significant way, since many demographics that were dis-
proportionately represented in the sample (female sex and higher 
levels of education, for example) were shown to have null effects on 
outcome variables. In addition, the demographics that did inter-
act with the experimental treatments were analyzed in detail using 
stratified analyses, and the sample was sufficiently large to enable 
significant results within subcategories or strata of demographic 
variables. Nevertheless, while this study attempts to account for a 
slightly biased sample, ideal future research will use representative 
sampling to ensure that the pool of participants matches the popu-
lation being studied.
"ird, this paper provides a significant and theoretically 
intuitive analysis of the role of politician race in shaping whites’ 
policy support, but the data are less clear with regard to the role 
of beneficiary race. As described above, the insignificant effect for 
beneficiary race is somewhat mystifying. I proposed three possible 
explanations for the apparent absence of this relationship, but fu-
ture research is required to determine if these are plausible.
Finally, this study was unable to consider the potential in-
fluence of intergroup contact, which represents a major school of 
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thought in academic work on racial attitudes. Intergroup contact 
theorists argue that geographical and/or interpersonal proximity 
to blacks is the most powerful predictor of racial attitudes among 
whites.57 Interracial contact appears to powerfully reduce racial 
prejudice, and theoretically it would have a protective or mediat-
ing effect in the relationship between racial prejudice and public 
opinion on social policy. Ideally, this relationship would have been 
tested, but because the sample is made up almost entirely of par-
ticipants from the Chicago metropolitan area, its predictive power 
would be very limited. Living in Chicago does not guarantee inter-
racial contact, but to fully address intergroup contact would require 
a much more geographically diverse sample (especially since the 
South appears to play a somewhat anomalous role) and a research 
design incorporating some metric of intergroup contact beyond 
what is achievable in a survey.58
CONCLUSION
In the end, this paper provides a somber reminder that racism 
remains a powerful influence on the political opinions of whites. 
Despite that the vast majority of white Americans claim to be col-
orblind and ambivalent with regard to race, this study provides evi-
dence that they react negatively to health legislation put forth by 
black politicians. Whites evaluating a black-endorsed health care 
plan also express higher levels of colorblind racial attitudes, racial 
resentment, and specific concerns about the plan (such as the be-
lief that it will lead to “health rationing” or a government takeover 
of the health care industry). "is effect is highest among insured, 
wealthy, and politically independent whites. 
As discussed in the previous section, the potential for a pro-
tective effect in intergroup contact compels us to search for ways 
that racism’s influence in public opinion formation can be dimin-
ished. From the perspective of public health, the stakes could not 
be higher. Blacks are diagnosed with the most crippling diseases at 
higher rates than whites. After being diagnosed with these diseases, 
blacks are more likely to die from them. To make matters worse, 
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blacks are almost twice as likely to be uninsured as whites. !e 
success of any practical attempt to resolve these dire inequities is 
contingent upon the support of the public.
!is is not a normative reflection on the Affordable Care 
Act nor an argument that its provisions are the only reasonable 
approach to fighting racial health gaps. !ere will always be, and 
should always be, variations in support for legislation depending on 
an individual’s predispositions and reasoning. Ethical orientation, 
partisanship, material self-interest, financial considerations, details 
of specific legislation, and so many more elements of public opinion 
will come into play. 
But the interference of racism has no place in the reasoning 
process. It is a dangerous imposition on rational thought, one that 
is most tragic when it suppresses the feasibility of legislation that 
would otherwise see higher levels of enthusiasm. !e Affordable 
Care Act was a victory for minority health, but its path was tumul-
tuous, and its success should not be taken for granted. Alwyn Co-
hall and Hope Bannister, writing for the anthology “Health Issues 
in the Black Community,” conclude:
Failure to act aggressively to counter the pathogens of poverty, 
lack of health insurance, and cultural insensitivity is no less a 
disgrace than withholding treatment for syphilis. While the cure 
for health disparities is not as simple as a shot of penicillin, there 
are concrete, tangible efforts that can be made today.59 
While we are far from providing a solution to eliminate these 
health discrepancies, the influence of racism in the public’s assess-
ment of our most promising attempts is a shameful cancer on so-
ciety. We should be prepared to do all we can to end its damaging 
and undemocratic influence.
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